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A Report on—and an Invitation to Join—the
LatCrit NGO
Tucker Culbertson
Inaugurated as part of the World Conference Against Racism, the LatCrit NGO seeks to further the codification and implementation of human
rights law and policy in egalitarian, historically informed, analytically rigorous, sociologically real, and culturally sensitive ways. In July 2006, the
United Nations’ Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) granted our application for consultative status. With this status, and through other future
endeavors, the LatCrit NGO pursues two interrelated goals:
(1) the interjection of critical and comparative analyses and arguments
regarding identity subordination into current dialogues within international legal and political institutions; and
(2) the provision of experiential learning opportunities for students as
authors and advocates of the analyses and arguments described above.
To this end, the LatCrit NGO seeks to establish a consortium comprised of: educational institutions, individual faculty members, clinical programs, academic centers, and community organizations willing to participate in producing work for distribution to ECOSOC and other international
institutions.
Structurally, participation in the consortium might involve: ongoing or
ad hoc contributions, existing courses or clinics, independent studies with
individual faculty members and students, or student organizations.
Substantively, participation in the consortium might: expand the existing undertakings and priorities of consortium members, advance ongoing
initiatives of the LatCrit NGO, or respond to emergent time-sensitive issues
under discussion by international institutions.
Formally, work products by consortium students might include: abridged literature reviews synthesizing existing critical and comparative
scholarship on a single topic in human rights law; policy briefs summarizFellow, Center for the Study of Law and Culture, Columbia University School of Law; Adjunct
Professor, Department of Political Science, San Francisco State University; Ph.D. Student, Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, UC-Berkeley; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, UC-Berkeley (2005);
A.B., Princeton University (1999).
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ing and critiquing the interpretation and enforcement of international legal
instruments; “shadow” reports identifying and expounding upon omissions
and discrepancies in official reports issued by governments or other NGOs;
evidence gathering around local human rights violations; empirical analyses
of the violation, enforcement, or adjudication of human rights law; amicus
briefs; or other work products that offer critical or comparative arguments
or analyses regarding human rights law.
We are eager to speak with you and strategize ways in which the LatCrit NGO can add to and draw from your work. The scale and style of such
collaboration would be tailored to your needs, capacities, and desires. Will
you join us?
What follows is an example of our work: our response to a recent
questionnaire from the High Commissioner on Human Rights regarding
gaps and obstacles in existing international laws on racism, xenophobia,
and related intolerance. (The questionnaire itself is included for your reference.) We hope this report gives you a sense of our general aims and specific initiatives. We hope we can soon amend our priorities and projects to
include new collaborations designed with you to supplement, support, or
expand the important work you are doing.
I. QUESTIONNAIRE ON COMPLEMENTARY STANDARDS ON RACISM,
XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE
A. Manifestations of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and
Related Intolerance
1. Please provide your comments on the question as to whether there
are normative gaps in the existing international legal instruments to
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance with regard to:
a.

Multiple or aggravated forms of racial discrimination,

b.

Ethnic cleansing,

c.

Genocide,

d.

Religious intolerance and defamation of religious symbols,

e.

racial discrimination in the private sphere,

f.

Incitement to racial hatred and dissemination of hate speech
and xenophobic and caricatured pictures, through traditional
mass media and information technology, including the Internet,

g.

Racial profiling,

h.

Other?
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2. If you have identified any gaps, can you please propose normative
contents that should be incorporated into the system of international
legal instruments to fill these gaps?
B. Protection of Victims of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia,
and Related Intolerance
1. Please provide your comments on the question as to whether there
are normative gaps in the existing international legal instruments to
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance with regard to the protection of:
a.

Religious groups,

b.

Refugees,

c.

Asylum-seekers,

d.

Stateless persons,

e.

Migrant workers,

f.

Internally displaced persons,

g.

Descent-based communities,

h.

Indigenous peoples,

i.

Minorities,

j.

People under foreign occupation,

k.

Other specific groups?

2. If you have identified any gaps, can you please propose normative
contents that should be incorporated into the system of international
legal instruments to fill these gaps?
C. Responsibilities (Positive Obligations) of States Parties
1. Please provide your comments on the question as to whether there
are normative gaps in the existing international legal instruments to
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance with regard to the establishment of related responsibilities, in
particular, in the context of:
a. Adopting and implementing comprehensive anti-discrimination
legislation;
b. Introducing legal definitions of types of discrimination in
national legislation;
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c. Providing for special measures to ensure equality (equal
opportunity and equal enjoyment);
d. Binding non-state actors and holding them accountable for
discrimination;
e. Ensuring effective remedies for victims of racial discrimination
and related abuses;
f. Applying appropriate rules, standards, and burdens of proof in
discrimination cases;
g. Promoting equality and tolerance through policies including
education on human nights, pluralism, and multiculturalism;
h.

Establishing and empowering specialized national bodies.

2. If you have identified any gaps, can you please propose normative
contents that should be incorporated into the system of international
legal instruments to fill these gaps?
D. Means and Avenues to Address the Possible Gaps
1. Please provide your comments on the suitability of the following
ways to address the possible substantive gaps in the existing international instruments to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance:
a.

Standard-setting
i.

Adoption of complementary international standards
1)

Amendment of the ICERD,

2) Protocol to the ICERD,
3) Adoption of other new instruments (conventions, declarations) on issues such as, e.g., human rights education or religious intolerance as proposed during the discussions in the
Working Group,
ii. Adoption of regional standards
iii. If the answers are positive, what should be the substantive
scope of a given form of standard setting?
b.

Standard-development
i.

Adoption of general recommendations/comments by:
1)

CERD,

2)

Other treaty bodies,
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ii. Updating CERD’s guidelines for State reporting to encourage Parties to report on specific aspects of racial discrimination
and xenophobia not addressed explicitly by treaty norms,
iii. Updating of reporting guidelines adopted by other treaty bodies,
iv. Updating OHCHR model anti-discrimination law to assist
States in adopting adequate anti-discrimination legislation complying with their obligations under the ICERD and reflecting concerns raised in the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action
and in the Intergovernmental Working Group on the effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action,
v. If you have identified any gaps, can you please propose the
substantive scope of a given form of standard development?
II. GENEVA, FEBRUARY 2007
RESPONSE OF THE LATCRIT NGO TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON
COMPLEMENTARY STANDARDS ON RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE
Latina and Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., (LatCrit) is an NGO in
Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations. LatCrit is a network of people of color and its allies who
are academics, lawyers, organizers, and others involved in multidimensional anti-subordination work addressing the intersection and mutual constitution of race, sex, gender, sexuality, language, religion, color, ability, and
other categories of identity that justify and are produced by exploitative and
interdependent systems of subordination. We assert that subordination
based on these identities, and on race and racism in particular, are both historical and structural. This understanding of race and racism prompts normative and institutional positions that are in some respects different from
those found in the present International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). In answering this questionnaire, we will introduce and apply our structural and historical analysis of
race and racism by reference to elements of the ICERD and other texts that
we find problematic or underdeveloped. We have proposed draft language
responsive to our analyses and arguments.
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A. Manifestations of Race Discrimination
The very concepts of race, races, and racism as we know them are fairly recent historical phenomena. In the wake of European colonization and
conquest in South Asia, the North Atlantic, Africa, and the whole Western
Hemisphere, various fields of knowledge and culture coalesced to diagnose,
deduce, report upon, govern, civilize, save, dispossess, abduct, enslave,
rape, and exterminate various races deemed lesser, savage, heathen, evil,
stupid, primitive, or otherwise different from and deficient as compared
with the peoples of European civilization. Scientific, religious, literary, and
other accounts of the several human races then justified the legal and political subordination of these new races, which was already well under way. In
this way, when we speak of international antidiscrimination laws on race,
races, and racisms, we are speaking of a very particular historical, cultural,
and geopolitical legacy: the legacy of modern European colonization.
Thus, it is most appropriate and important that the ICERD explicitly
1
link its conception of race discrimination with European colonialism. This
link illustrates the actual, historical specificity of these texts’ apparently
universal address. International laws on race discrimination are intertwined
with a specific denomination of racism: European colonialism. Though
international antidiscrimination laws on race cannot be reduced only to matters of decolonization prompted by European occupation, such laws must at
a minimum effectuate exactly such decolonization. Such laws also should
take this context of decolonization as a jurisprudential paradigm for the
development of other antidiscrimination regimes regarding race.
Because international race discrimination law is a law of decolonization, it is not a moral banishment of race as such from matters of law and
policy. Quite the contrary. This much is evident from the texts’ declarations
2
that “affirmative action” is not discriminatory. This clear commitment in
these texts should be emphasized: states must distinguish decolonization
3
from deracialization.

1
The Preamble to the ICERD emphasizes that “the United Nations has condemned colonialism
and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith, in whatever form and wherever
they exist, and that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
of 14 December 1960 (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)) has affirmed and solemnly proclaimed
the necessity of bringing them to a speedy and unconditional end.” G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), at 47, U.N.
Doc. A/98 (Dec. 20, 1965).
2
E.g., Art. 1.2 of the ICERD.
3
The great and cruel irony of contemporary U.S. Constitutional laws on racial inequality is the
prohibition by the Supreme Court of “affirmative action” programs meant to redress the material historical consequences of centuries of diverse forms of racial subordination. Thus, governments’ voluntary or
mandatory distribution of work to racial minorities has been declared racially discriminatory. This of
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Consequently, international antidiscrimination laws on race ought
not—already do not—prohibit race-based policy as being necessarily a manifestation of race discrimination. A reciprocal requirement, though, is not
sufficiently addressed by existing law. International antidiscrimination laws
on race ought not prohibit race-based policy as the primary or predominant
manifestation of race discrimination.
Race is a social construction, meaning it is neither essential nor natural, but is rather a category of human thought and action. Race has not been
addressed by, but rather produced through legal, commercial, religious, and
4
other institutions. As such, foundational structures of law and governance
—even and often especially those that appear race-neutral—must be reconstructed in order to meaningfully counter racism. Structural manifestations
of racism must therefore be apprehended by international antidiscrimination
law.
Because of the aforementioned structural dimensions of race and racism, manifestations of race discrimination cannot be limited to individual
claims of race-based animosity, stereotyping, or differentiation. Rather,
antidiscrimination jurisprudence must be—because race and racism are—
structural engagements in human relations and resource distribution. As
European colonialism surely did, international antidiscrimination law must
impose upon radically diverse social scenes and actors so as to explicitly reengineer power relations among individuals and groups in local, national,
regional, and global politics. International antidiscrimination law must
explicitly draw within its bounds all practices that are means or profits of
racial subordination, be they public, private, differentiating, dominating,
intentional, effective, subconscious, institutional, idiosyncratic, collective,
or individual in their characters.

course is absurd. The international texts on racial discrimination, like other national constitutions, clearly state that such acts of decolonizing reconstruction are not acts of race discrimination.
4
Moreover, race is a narrative and psychosocial structure that produces human experience, even
and often as a subconscious schema or script for cognition and behavior. See Linda Hamilton Krieger,
The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 (4) JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES 835 (2004); Linda Hamilton Krieger,
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Ian Haney-Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct
and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000); Ian F. Haney-López, “A Nation
of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007).
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B & C. Remedies for and States’ Affirmative Obligations Regarding Race
Discrimination
As a consequence of all the foregoing, international antidiscrimination
laws on race must not just prohibit and redress intentional, explicit, or other
obviously racial policies of States Parties on behalf of individual petitioners. International antidiscrimination laws on race must also urge states to:
(1) Acknowledge and develop a programmatic commitment to countering the continuing legacies of European colonization;
(2) Redress and reconstruct every disparate impact upon historically
and presently subordinated racialized groups;
(3) Research and provide material reparations to historically subordinated racialized groups, including but not limited to those groups dispossessed, abducted, enslaved, raped, exterminated, or otherwise injured by European colonization;
(4) Instigate institutional scrutiny and reconstruction aimed at:
(a) Counteracting particular relevant histories of racism; and
(b) Seeking counsel of historically and presently subordinated
and/or struggling racialized groups.
Also, and in particular, this historical and structural definition of race
and racism speaks against the unmitigated deference to states’ disparate
treatment of non-citizens established in the ICERD and other international
rights instruments and institutions. It seems that concern over the ways in
which nationality and/or alienage coincide with race and racism partly animate this Questionnaire and the Durban Programme, given their emphases
on xenophobia, migration, occupation, and profiling. Such emphases are
well-founded and should lead ultimately to a modification of international
antidiscrimination laws’ deference to states as regards the difference alienage makes. Race was originally and has been always a question
of citizenship. Racial categories in law, science, religion, and philosophy
functioned chiefly to place certain persons, peoples, lands, and cultures
beyond legal recognition and political obligation. Race was always a justification of injustice precisely because it entailed a refusal or reservation of
citizenship. As such, a properly decolonizing international antidiscrimination law on race would require reconstruction of law and government as
regards non-citizens. The mandate for just treatment of aliens is already
manifest in humanitarian law and human rights law. The exception for and
deference to states’ differentiation of non-citizens is thus problematic for
the ICERD and any international rights instrument. No doubt questions of
migration, war, trade, and other matters may refer to and depend upon ques-
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tions of citizenship. Such dependence is endemic to a society of nationstates. However, because of race’s historical and structural inseparability
from nationality and citizenship, the categorical exclusion of states’ distinctions of non-citizens from the reach of international antidiscrimination laws
on race impinges profoundly and foundationally upon the capacity of such
5
laws to comprehend race and racism.
To challenge race discrimination as unjust necessarily entails a reciprocal challenge to justice defined by citizenship. Fundamental rights must
be fully granted to non-citizens in every encounter with state governments
if international race discrimination law is to actually encounter and counteract the historical and structural force of racism.
In addition to the foregoing list of obligations, under a historical and
structural antidiscrimination regime:
(5) Public and private institutions, groups, and individuals must recognize and enfranchise the fundamental rights of all, including individuals, groups, and institutions of allegedly foreign citizenship or
origin.
In particular:
(6) In practices of detention (whether matters of law enforcement,
migration, or war) all persons must be granted:
(a) The rights and privileges afforded States parties’ own citizens
in criminal contexts;

5
In the United States this matter has been repeatedly and brutally made apparent. Some manifestations of the mutual constitution of systems of racial and national subordination in the United States
include:

1) The Alien Act of 1789 in which citizenship under the new United States was immediately and
for more than a century restricted to persons racialized as White;
2) The case of Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), in which the Supreme Court
declared citizenship a natural, moral, and political impossibility for Africans and African Americans;
3) The internment of Japanese and Japanese-American residents and citizens during World War
II;
4) The present U.S. government’s extraordinary and brutal systems of profiling, policing, and detention in its “War on Terror.” Such systems are officially reserved for aliens, and are often if not
always discrimination based on national origin, color, race, and religion along with national citizenship. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). For commentary, see Neil K. Katyal & Laurence H.
Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1298-1304
(2002).
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(b) The minimum standards of humanitarian law under States’ parties own laws and customs as well as international law and custom;
and
(c) The fundamental rights deemed fundamental under States’ parties’ own laws and customs as well as international law and custom.
Another contemporary global phenomenon speaks against the deference shown in international antidiscrimination and other human rights laws
toward States regarding the relevance of citizenship. All international laws
crafted in the interest of individual dignity and freedom—especially but not
exclusively antidiscrimination laws on race—must confront the conscious,
ongoing, and deliberate failure of migrant-receiving countries to regulate
justly low-wage labor migration.
These migrations, this labor, and these failures to regulate justly are
the cause and consequence of histories and systems of subordination based
on race, national origin, color, and language. Such issues have always been
and are still necessarily matters of race, racism, and xenophobia, and must
be reached by international antidiscrimination law.
Unfortunately, the ICERD’s aptly broad definition of “racial discrimination” (recognizing not only race and colour, but also national or ethnic
origin (Art. 1.1)) is undermined profoundly by the explicit allowance that
States may distinguish, exclude, restrict, and allow preferences between
citizens and non-citizens (Art. 1.2). This problem sadly cannot be remedied
by the subsequent caveat that such distinctions may not discriminate against
any particular nationality. Intentional or effective racial discrimination may
nonetheless be perpetrated by a State’s migration policies. For example, in
the United States, workers of irregular status are not entitled to the remedy
of back-pay when an employer unlawfully terminates them for engaging in
6
the legally protected activity of union organizing. Consequently, the incentive for employers to exploit workers in an irregular status increases, while
7
workers’ rights to redress for exploitation decrease. Latina, Latino, and
other racialized and nationalized minorities working in low wage employment, such as agriculture and construction, are thus systematically pipelined
into workplaces with high rates of injury, death, discrimination, and exploitation. In this way, the deference found to States’ parties regarding citizenship and migration in international human rights laws is counterproduc-

6

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
The Hoffman Plastic decision has resulted in a reduction of all labor and employment rights of
migrant workers, who are usually also members of a historically and structurally subordinated racialized
and/or nationalized group.
7
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tive—especially but not exclusively in laws regarding race, racism, and
xenophobia.
Nonetheless, current international human rights laws declare allocations of visas (and other matters of migration policy) an incident of national
sovereignty immune from scrutiny under international rights regimes. Re8
cent and important innovations, such as the Inter-American Court’s OC-18,
still focus only on in-country treatment of residents according to this standard, which is problematically deferential to States. The ICERD and other
texts’ deference to States in matters of citizenship and migration, if not reconsidered and qualified, will surely and can only displace, transform, and
legitimate racial discrimination under other guises.
Recent laws move against this counterproductive deference, including
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Their Families (the “Migrant Workers Convention”), drafted
specifically to address contemporary structures of racial and national dis9
parity and subordination. Economic, social, and cultural rights regimes
empower the United Nations to scrutinize economic and social programming relating to poverty and basic health indicators. In a similarly structural and affirmatively obligatory fashion, international human rights regimes—especially but not exclusively international antidiscrimination laws
on race—must recognize visa allocation (and other matters of migration
policy) as a critical issue of human rights in the historically unique, structurally contrived arrangements of contemporary multinational migration, production, and exchange.
Subsequent international human rights instruments, institutions, proceedings, and commentaries should and might heed the principles of the
Migrant Workers Convention. They should and might also heed the principle articulated by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights on the
10
Rights of Undocumented Migrants, in which it held that international
principles of human rights prohibit discrimination on the basis of immigra11
tion status. In its opinion, the Court clearly articulates the obligations of
States to ensure that once a worker enters into an employment relationship,
“the migrant acquires rights as a worker, which must be recognized and
8
OC-18 is the Inter-American Court’s advisory opinion on the rights of undocumented workers.
Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. OC-18/03
(2003), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_18_ing.pdf.
9
The Preamble of the Migrant Workers Convention articulates this concern quite precisely.
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families,
G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 69th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990).
10 The Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, September 17, 2003, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/serie_a_18_ing.pdf.
11 Id.
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guaranteed, irrespective of his regular or irregular status in the State of em12
ployment,” outlining fundamental labor rights which must be respected,
13
including the right of access to justice.
As such, we propose that:
(7) Receiving governments must recognize, decriminalize, legitimize,
legalize, and regulate the massive flows of low wage labor migration
that take place throughout—and are indispensable to—the global
economy.
(8) Future international law should affirm the holding in the InterAmerican Court’s OC-18 by stating that:
(a) Once in-country and working, undocumented workers must receive the same rights and remedies as other workers; and
(b) Special measures must be taken at all stages of migration to ensure that undocumented workers enjoy those rights.
These final recommendations are crucial to international antidiscrimination laws on race. Low-wage labor migration issues are often inherently
and/or effectively matters of national origin, color, and language. They are
therefore also matters of race, racism, and xenophobia.

Id. at ¶ 134.
In the case of migrant workers, there are certain rights that assume a fundamental importance
and yet are frequently violated, such as: the prohibition of obligatory or forced labor; the prohibition and
abolition of child labor; special care for women workers; the rights corresponding to freedom of
association and to organize and join a trade union; collective negotiation; fair wages for work
performed; social security; judicial and administrative guarantees, a working day of reasonable length
with adequate working conditions (safety and health), rest, and compensation. The safeguard of these
rights for migrants has great importance based on the principle of the inalienable nature of such rights,
which all workers possess, irrespective of their migratory status, and also the fundamental principle of
human dignity embodied in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration, according to which “[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, at 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
12
13

